Kansas and competency-based education

First off I want to make it clear that I'm not opposed to competence, but before the State of Kansas and its educators accept the methodologies included in competency-based education (CBE) they should consider the following questions:

1. Do the promoters of competency-based education mean to exclude all non-behavioral objectives in formal schooling? That is, do they mean by "behavioral objectives" only those publicly observable? They are not clear on this point.

2. How will a competency be defined, and by whom? Which competencies will be included in the curriculum? Which not? Why?

3. Are administrators prepared to assume the role of assessing competencies? Where are they going to find the time to carry out these tedious evaluations? Will we have to create another level of administrative bureaucracy in order to oversee the CBE program?

4. Will teachers who have not been trained in CBE techniques be given adequate opportunity to acquire that training before they are evaluated in the use of CBE methods?

5. What will be the criteria for the "successful performance" of a given teaching behavior? Who will determine these criteria? How will a behavior be assessed to determine if it meets these criteria?

Proponents of CBE in Kansas will argue that these questions have been satisfactorily answered by those working in states that have mandated this educational elixir. Nothing is further from the truth. Many states have simply superimposed the rhetoric and some CBE practice over the existing system. This combination has created general confusion and good money for consultants. Also, CBE has proven to be very time consuming and expensive. These massive expenditures of time and money offset some of the proposed reasons for CBE in the first place.

As of this time, there is no evidence that proves CBE to be superior to traditional practice. Let's not kid ourselves, CBE is another attempt to move the responsibility of educating youth from the community to the national state. CBE allows state and federal authorities to specify what children will learn and how that learning will be measured.

Charles Litz
Co-editor
In an important sense, grading is a moral issue.

A question of testing and grading

by Robert Paul Craig

Howard Kirschenbaum and his colleagues in their book *Wadja-get: The Grading Game in American Education*, point out both the absurd and almost immoral extent to which the question of grading can go. In regard to justifying grades, they write:

But then I realized that this kid usually gets a B+ or A−, so when I read my comments, he would say to himself, “Why not a B+ or an A−?” So I had to go back over the paper and find places to make some more comments in order to justify clearly the B−. (p. 105)

In an important sense, grading is a moral issue, for grades are part of the student’s permanent record file; and they can be looked up and used for hiring and other purposes. Grades, like an albatross around the neck, follow one throughout his or her life. Thus, important questions need to be asked, such as: In what sense are grades an objective indicator of a student’s academic progress? Again, from Kirschenbaum:

“I’m in full agreement with you Henry,” Ingles said. “I figure I’ve recorded probably 12,000 grades during my teaching career, and I’m really proud about the objectivity of my grading. Numbers don’t lie; and when I throw them up in that rollo,T, any student can check my math and see that he’s gotten just what he worked for.” (p. 131)

Is this teacher’s mathematical assessment correct? Is grading a matter of mathematics? Or, is there a sense in which grades are indicative of a self-fulfilling prophecy? R. Rosenthal and L. Jacobson in their book *Pygmalion in the Classroom: Self-fulfilling Prophecies and Teacher Expectations* point out that teacher expectations play a large part in subsequent grading. For example, if a teacher was informed that a student was a slow learner, there is a high statistical correlation between the student’s academic profile and subsequent grades. This is the case even if the student is a high achiever, but is classified as a slow learner. More important questions: Are grades often the result of teacher expectations? Is it moral to classify students in this way?

It seems to be the case that grading is a moral activity in that teachers are assigning values to the academic (and sometimes affective) progress of human beings. And, since grading is a valuational activity, it becomes inherently a philosophical concern. Different perspectives on the nature of teaching and learning become part and parcel of the notion of evaluation. If teaching (or learning) is a strictly measurable affair, one’s concept of grading would differ from the notion that there are aspects of the teaching (or learning) process which are not strictly measurable.
Kenneth Conklin maintains that before a teacher can evaluate a student she or he must ask important philosophical questions. For instance, they must have a commitment to some particular epistemology. How do students learn is logically prior to the question of evaluation. Thus, teachers need to investigate the theory of knowledge.

Likewise teachers need to reflect about the philosophy of mind. I am not suggesting that every teacher should be a philosopher of sorts; rather I am saying that there are essential philosophical questions each teacher should ask. Some training in philosophy or philosophy of education would be desirable. The general philosophical issue presented here is: How does one gain knowledge of other minds? I can know with some certainty that I know such and such—unless as the philosopher Descartes imagines, there is an omnipotent evil God who is deceiving me. But, how can I be certain that someone else knows? This is an especially problematic question if the knowledge a student claims to possess is beyond or different than the teacher’s knowledge. Can a teacher infer the knowledge of other minds from the paradigm of her or his own? This deeply philosophical issue is certainly not settled.

But there are varying educational epistemologies depending on the philosophical commitments of the teacher, among other qualities. The perspective of an empiricist has different implications for the issue of grading than the perspective of an idealist. The empiricist demands empirical evidence to demonstrate that a student knows X. The teacher listens to the student recite, or she or he gives an examination. For the empiricist, physical evidence alone is the only basis for giving grades.

Other philosophers, idealists, disagree, for they insist that the student’s intended meaning is more important than the use of objective evidence in giving grades. Some idealists suggest that even objective evidence needs to be interpreted in light of the student’s intended meaning. The idealist has a good point, for students can guess at answers on tests and not know the correct answer at all. Empirical data, such as written tests, are not always a reasonable basis for giving grades.

Yet, the empiricist has a retort. By defining learning as a “change in behavior,” the empiricist feels that this learning can be successfully measured. This issue also has philosophical implications, for this is a concern of the branch of philosophy called ontology. The empiricist claim demands an excursion into the nature of reality. Is interaction with the environment merely a matter of observing physical behavior, as the empiricist maintains? Is learning merely a measurable change in behavior? The idealist would answer negatively to both questions, for she or he feels that reality is not mainly physical at all—it also has transcendent, spiritual properties. According to the idealist, learning is not synonymous with a change in behavior; it is also concerned with self-actualization.

For the empiricist, grading means the measuring of behavioral change; for the idealist it involves an intuition of the student’s intended meaning. It is the student who interprets various subjects, history, for instance; and it is through this personal interpretation that the student discovers knowledge. The empiricist position on grading is problematic because it makes it almost impossible to grade students on knowledge the teacher does not possess. It is conceivable that a student may be more informed on a particular topic than the instructor is. Using the empiricist’s own criterion, there is no measurable standard by which to measure this degree of knowledge.

But idealism even runs into difficulty in regard to grading, for there may be too much reliance on subjective factors in determining a grade. Yet idealism seems to be the better of the two theories, because its proponents admit the importance of empathy and intuition in grading. This means, in part, that the idealist bridges the gap between cognitive and affective factors in learning; while the empiricist seems to rely too heavily on cognitive factors.

Historically grading has always been problematic to educators. Alan Small points out that early in the history of American education teachers had at least two quite distinct functions, namely, teaching and examining. His survey of the history of grading in American education shows that from the Colonial period to the mid-nineteenth century these two functions were kept distinct. Teachers taught subject matter, and a board of examiners did the testing. Many educational problems were alleviated by this system, for scholastic achievement was not measured by teachers. The problem of the variability of teacher’s grades did not exist.

The pass-fail method of grading likewise is not new. It was initiated during the Colonial period. Even during this period some students attempted to learn only enough to “pass the test.” One problem with this pass-fail system is that there is virtually no way to deal with individual differences or with levels of excellence, for the same standard applied to all students. Small insists that if the classroom teacher continues to have the sole responsibility for grading, students and teachers will continue to be put into an adversarial or competitive relationship. Small opts for an independent examining-marking process; certain departmental members would be responsible for examining and grading.

At one level, grades can be a thorn in the side of positive student-teacher relationships. It can also be a means of controlling human beings. At least this is Clarence Karier’s contention. In his opinion, which is developed through the use of much historical evidence, testing and grading can, and indeed have been used as a method of fitting people into the ideology of the corporate liberal state. For example, he contends that there was an explicit philosophy inherent in much of grading and testing: a racist philosophy.

He suggests that the liberal tradition, from Jefferson on, assumed that there is a positive relationship between talent (often measured in grades) and virtue. Karier writes: “It is not surprising to find people assuming that a person low in talent will also lack virtue, a relationship assumed in most sterilization laws.” In fact, Karier points out that the illiterate were often viewed as a threat to society—and the illiterate included many immigrants and members of racial minorities. Karier proposes that the general purpose of American schooling was to bring about a salvation of sorts—appropriate standards of conduct—and the virtue of patriotism must be developed in wayward persons.

We witness, then, the rise of meritocracy, for I.Q. tests, among others, were used to measure educational merit. And merit seemed to be synonymous with virtue. In other words, since many immigrants and minority individuals scored rather low on these tests, it was assumed, by Terman and others, that they were morally as well as intellectually inferior. Karier goes so far as to insist that the structure of American society was based on the idea of meritocracy—“a meritocracy of white, middle-class, management oriented professionals.”
This was evident in the tracking plan in which immigrants and minority students were put into vocational programs, while many middle-class white students were put into liberal arts and pre-college programs; these were a necessary condition for their rise into the meritocracy. Thus, Karier’s main point is that testing and grading were used as ways to guarantee order in the corporate liberal state.

Some educational theorists even go further than Karier in their indictment of grading and testing. Sidney Simon, for instance, claims that grades perform a negative function for they separate teachers and students into two warring camps—a criticism made also by Small. Simon further suggests that grades punish the students who cannot compete adequately. Grades can be constructive in the learning process, for they can reinforce a negative self-concept. Thus, Simon insists that grading and testing must be abolished.

A final point needs to be made, namely, the relationship between grades and subsequent occupational or even academic success. D.E. Levin found, for instance, that grades are poor predictors of future occupational or academic endeavors, for there are other important criteria of success—one’s personality and drive, for example.

Likewise, it is the contention of Patricia Wright that grades may predict a certain amount of success in academic endeavors, although even this is highly questionable. But they do not predict such important occupational variables as tolerance to stress, endurance, or the ability to apply what has been learned in school. Certainly these studies bring grading (and testing) into a new light. The purposes of both grading and testing need to be re-evaluated.

In this brief essay I have not attempted to answer these complex questions about grading and testing; rather I have tried to put the issue(s) into perspective. Several important questions need to be assessed: Is either the empiricist or the idealist perspective correct? In what sense is grading a moral issue? How do grades become part of social-political control? What is the relationship, if any, between grades and one’s subsequent academic or occupational possibilities? Each teacher must take a position on these important issues.

References
3. Ibid., p. 190.
5. Ibid., p. 115.
6. Ibid., p. 123.
This research suggests that public disclosure of evaluations best be curtailed.

Effect of students’ expectations

by Thomas S. Parish, Richard F. Palazzo, Joycelyn G. Parish

Student evaluations of teacher effectiveness can be an important tool for aiding instructors in improving their teaching skills. However, the practice of publicly disclosing these evaluations is a topic of concern to many educators.

According to Rosenthal (1973), the Pygmalion effect lives and flourishes in our classrooms today. The Pygmalion effect, as Rosenthal (1973) has described it, occurs when students live up, or down, to the expectations of their teachers. That teacher expectation does indeed influence student performance has been demonstrated in various ways in many different experiments (e.g., Beez, 1968; Chaikin, Sigler, & Darlega, 1974).

The Pygmalion effect is not necessarily restricted, however, to how teachers’ expectations influence their subsequent judgment of student performance. Indeed, other studies have reported how students’ expectations of teachers have influenced their subsequent evaluation of their teachers’ performances (e.g., Herrell, 1971; Kelley, 1950). Herrell’s (1971) study, for example, has indicated that public disclosure of students’ evaluations of teachers has a particularly negative effect on subsequent students’ attitudes toward the teachers who had been unfavorably evaluated by students in the past.

As demonstrated in the Herrell (1971) experiment, public disclosure of students’ evaluations of teachers may actually create a negative set in students toward unfavorably rated teachers.

Given this negative effect of publicly disclosed student evaluations of teachers, it is indeed hard to justify continuation of such a practice, unless perhaps students who fill out teacher evaluation forms for later public disclosure are more frank and candid about the teacher’s abilities than students who fill out teacher evaluation forms intended for the teacher’s use only. In other words, it is hard to justify public disclosure unless evaluations by students vary due to expectations as to how the teacher evaluations will be used. If no significant difference exists then it would appear that little, if anything, can be gained by using publicly disclosed evaluations.

Subjects
All of the junior and senior level students enrolled in 12 sections of an educational psychology course at Oklahoma State University participated as subjects in this experiment. In all, nine instructors were evaluated by their students. Of the 284 students participating in this study, 129 students were randomly assigned to Group I, and 135 students were randomly assigned to Group II.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items on the Instructor Evaluation Questionnaire and Statistical Data Relating to These Items Across Form A (Public Use Scale) and Form B (Professor’s Use Scale)</th>
<th>( t ) Test Scores and Probability Levels For Each Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Items which appeared on Instructor Evaluation Form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate each of the course or instructor characteristics using the following scale:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. excellent</td>
<td>( t = 0.05, \ p = .960 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. very good</td>
<td>( t = 1.36, \ p = .170 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. good</td>
<td>( t = -0.07, \ p = .942 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. fair</td>
<td>( t = -0.52, \ p = .606 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. poor</td>
<td>( t = -0.35, \ p = .727 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The clarity with which the instructor communicated the aim of the course to me.</td>
<td>( t = 1.10, \ p = .274 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The preparedness of the instructor for class.</td>
<td>( t = 0.00, \ p = .998 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The clarity of the instructor’s presentations.</td>
<td>( t = -0.29, \ p = .775 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The value of the instructor’s presentations.</td>
<td>( t = -0.36, \ p = .716 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The degree to which the instructor stimulated my desire to know more about the subject.</td>
<td>( t = 0.78, \ p = .439 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The extent to which the instructor encouraged students to ask questions. (most encouragement A ... E least encouragement)</td>
<td>( t = 0.97, \ p = .335 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The instructor’s ability to answer students’ questions.</td>
<td>( t = -0.97, \ p = .335 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The extent to which the instructor encouraged class discussion. (most encouragement A ... E least encouragement)</td>
<td>( t = 0.95, \ p = .395 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The extent to which the instructor spent time on unimportant and irrelevant material. (least time A ... E most time)</td>
<td>( t = -0.05, \ p = .960 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The extent to which I felt free to express my opinions in class, even when I disagreed with the instructor. (most free A ... E least free)</td>
<td>( t = 0.77, \ p = .440 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The overall value of the class sessions.</td>
<td>( t = 0.36, \ p = .270 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The instructor’s enthusiasm for the subject matter.</td>
<td>( t = 0.24, \ p = .814 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. The instructor’s knowledge of the subject matter.</td>
<td>( t = -0.29, \ p = .770 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. The extent to which the instructor encouraged students to think for themselves. (most encouragement A ... E least encouragement)</td>
<td>( t = 0.83, \ p = .405 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The extent to which I saw the course material as being related to my life outside of class. (most related A ... E least related)</td>
<td>( t = 0.10, \ p = .924 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. The willingness of the instructor to talk to students individually, outside of class.</td>
<td>( t = 0.80, \ p = .422 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. The extent to which the instructor seemed to be interested in and care about students. (most interested A ... E least interested)</td>
<td>( t = 0.53, \ p = .597 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. The value of the assigned readings.</td>
<td>( t = 1.46, \ p = .144 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. The value of the assignments (other than assigned readings). Leave blank if there were none.</td>
<td>( t = 1.91, \ p = .057 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. The extent to which the instructor made it clear what material the exams would cover. (most clear A ... E least clear)</td>
<td>( t = 0.12, \ p = .905 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. The adequacy of the exams in testing my knowledge of the subject matter of the course.</td>
<td>( t = 1.29, \ p = .199 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. The value of the exams as a learning experience.</td>
<td>( t = -0.18, \ p = .860 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. The clarity with which the instructor described the grading procedures.</td>
<td>( t = 0.53, \ p = .596 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. The fairness of the grading procedures.</td>
<td>( t = -0.32, \ p = .748 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. The reasonableness of the amount of work required. (most reasonable A ... E least reasonable)</td>
<td>( t = .25, \ p = .603 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. My enjoyment of this course.</td>
<td>( t = .25, \ p = .603 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Over-all value of this course for me.</td>
<td>( t = .25, \ p = .603 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. The instructor’s over-all teaching ability.</td>
<td>( t = .25, \ p = .603 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total across all comparisons</td>
<td>( t = .25, \ p = .603 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Procedure
At the end of the semester, during the week preceding final exams, Forms A and B of the instructor evaluation questionnaire were administered to the students in Groups I and II, respectively.
The 28 items that appeared on Form A and Form B of the instructor evaluation questionnaire are presented in Table 1. Forms A and B differ only in the instructions that were presented to the students before they filled out the instructor evaluation questionnaires. The instructions for Form A were as follows:
This questionnaire gives you an opportunity to express anonymously your views of this course and the way it was taught.
Its purpose is to assist in the improvement of instruction. It will serve this purpose best if you answer the items carefully and honestly. To insure your anonymity do not write your name on this evaluation form. These evaluation forms will not be reviewed by the instructor until final grades are received by the Registrar's Office. These evaluation forms and their results will be made available for public inspection.
The instructions for Form B were as follows:
This questionnaire gives you an opportunity to express anonymously your views of this course and the way it was taught. Its purpose is to assist in the improvement of instruction. It will serve this purpose best if you answer the questions carefully and honestly. To insure your anonymity do not write your name on this evaluation form. These evaluation forms will not be reviewed by the instructor until final grades are received by the Registrar's Office. These evaluation forms are for the professor's own use and their contents will not be publicly disclosed.
Notably, only the underlined segments of the instructions of Form A and Form B actually differ.

Results
Of the 28 items on Forms A and B of the instructor evaluation questionnaire, no significant differences were found as a result of the different instructions. As is numerically illustrated in the right hand column of Table 1, none of the t values reached or exceeded the .05 probability level.

Discussion
The findings of this experiment demonstrated that extremely similar instructor evaluations were obtained from the two groups of students, even though one group expected that their instructor evaluations were for the instructor's use only. The 28 items on the instructor evaluation questionnaire used in this experiment are very much like items used to rate instructors at many of our institutions of higher education. Since there was little new or different information secured from those students who expected that their instructor evaluations would be subsequently available for public inspection, it seems rather questionable to encourage the practice of allowing students' evaluations of instructors to be made available to other students who will subsequently be studying with the same instructors. As pointed out by Rosenthal (1968) past evaluations give rise to future expectations, and such expectations seem to quite unwittingly create a self-fulfilling prophecy.

References

Footnote
Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas S. Parish, College of Education, Holton Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506.
This article discusses the future of Competency-based Teacher Education.

Competency-based Teacher Education in proper perspective

by James Stover Taylor

Competency-based Teacher Education (CBTE) has become one of the most significant forces in contemporary education. The intent of this article is to discuss critically the past and more importantly, the future development of the movement. CBTE has been receiving tremendous publicity throughout academic circles. It is by no means, however, meeting with universal approval. The critics are legion, and unless further growth in the CBTE movement is tempered with a realistic realignment of thought, their presence will not diminish.

Historically and sociologically, the emergence of CBTE was an attempt to counter some of the inequalities of education. The major thrust was to provide more relevance in the content of instruction. With this laudable goal in mind, professionals began developing and implementing CBTE programs in colleges and universities throughout the country.

As the number of programs rapidly grew, the academic community became more observant and concerned. Many inquiries into the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the movement were met with varied and often discrepant responses. There were many practitioners opposing what was being proposed within the CBTE philosophy. Program developers were implementing tailored approaches which each felt best represented a competency-based strategy. This resulted in a wide variability among programs, which in turn blurred attempts to focus on the common underpinnings of competency-based education. Philosophically, then, CBTE cannot easily be defined. While closely allied to the humanistic school, as an educational practice, it draws from both humanism and behaviorism (Taylor, Pound, & Newhouse, 1975).

From the humanistic school of thought, several factors have been incorporated into CBTE. The planning and organization of learning experiences includes active involvement by the student. The student is also afforded alternative modes of learning to ensure at least one learning route that each student can use effectively. Teacher/student interaction is also important as a means of facilitating affective development and a positive learning situation (Taylor, Pound, & Newhouse, 1975).
From the behavioristic school of thought, CBTE has also borrowed several important principles. First, the student is provided knowledge of results more quickly than in traditional approaches. Positive reinforcement is intended to stimulate student interest and effort. The emphasis in CBTE is success-oriented, rather than failure-oriented; i.e., the student continues to attempt a unit of study until he/she realizes successful completion. The student is evaluated by a criterion-referencing system which minimizes interpersonal competition. Finally, the teacher's expectations are made explicit to the student through operationally specified behavioral objectives (Taylor, Pound, & Newhouse, 1975).

While this eclectic philosophical and theoretical stance makes CBTE more compatible with psychological data and educational practice, it also fosters confusion among professionals as to what constitutes a well-developed CBTE program. The traditional view that behaviorism and humanism are antithetical is inconsistent with the eclectic philosophy of CBTE. The success that the CBTE movement has experienced to date is in large part due to the willingness of those involved to break from both behaviorism and humanism in establishing their programs. This is a laudable beginning. However, the future of CBTE depends upon a more fully defined and explicated theoretical foundation from which research may emerge.

Thus, the logical next step would be to empirically investigate the functional utility of the theoretical constructs which are to be incorporated into CBTE programs. The validity of any theory should be tested through controlled observations before being put into practice. The most recognized and respected defense for any instructional approach is empirical verification. In this sense, practitioners in the CBTE movement have been remiss. Those involved must realize a more focused perspective toward the future. Without a solid theoretical base, little relevant research can be generated in defense of the movement. Professionals who are critical of CBTE recognize this shortcoming. Their demand for evidence to justify the fanfare is not unwarranted. CBTE cannot afford the present paucity of research to be the future demise of the movement.

One major problem CBTE professionals must face is that of specifying the competencies which a teacher should possess. This is likely the most pressing question in teacher education (McDonald, 1974). It seems absurd to develop programs built around a cluster of competencies which may or may not be necessary and sufficient. Only through empirical inquiry can these competencies be identified. The means needed to achieve this end have clearly been stated. McDonald (1975) suggests a number of experimental designs which would be appropriate. Kirk (1972) offers a critique of each of these in his text.

The large sums of money which have been made available from numerous sources have predominantly been directed toward the establishment of additional programs. Without the common denominator of a unified philosophical and theoretical base, these programs will no doubt be quite varied in their perspectives. The future advancement of CBTE depends upon the union of those involved. If research is to make a contribution, funding must be channeled specifically for that purpose.

Potter (1974) suggests field-based inquiry as the preferred research approach. Naturalistic observation would have certain advantages over laboratory inquiry. The investigator would be more likely to maintain contact with the teachers in the field. This would help to ensure effective communication. Also, the transition from the research phase to the establishment of an operational program would be smoother. Many professionals agree that field-based research would be more likely to receive federal support (Potter, 1974; Sobol, 1975; Sullivan, 1975).

Propositions of CBTE have been overzealous. They have tried to erect the house before the foundation is laid. I would argue that CBTE has vast potential as an effective approach to teacher education. To fully realize that potential, the movement must build upon a firm knowledge base; a foundation painstakingly constructed through the disciplined rigors of empirical research. All enduring progress which has been made in education has been from scaffold to scaffold; that being the proper perspective for the future.

References


Both analysis and experience are necessary forms in the classroom. Together, they complement each other.

On the being of a teacher: analysis vs. experience in the classroom

by Linda Preston Scott

Linda Preston Scott is an associate professor in the Department of Education/Psychology at Kentucky State University in Frankfort. She is also the director of Research in Education and Psychology and is in the process of developing curriculum research in women's studies. She is a consultant to a number of educational organizations and has published several papers on a wide variety of topics. She received her PhD from the University of Kentucky.

In attempting to discuss ideas about what goes on (and should go on) in the classroom, I sometimes am the recipient of some rather derogatory remarks when I rely on words such as Apollonian or Dionysian to explain some of my thoughts on teaching. My friends who are more "classroom" oriented tell me to get my head from a rather private place and talk sensibly—"After all," they declare, "Apollo and Dionysus may have their place in Greek Myth, but in the seventh grade? No way!"

However, I fail to be convinced that we can't learn just a little bit of "practical" knowledge from looking at these terms—at least they say something to me—and I hope I can convince you that their study has merit. Perhaps the way to approach an explanation of what the terms Apollonian and Dionysian have to do with the classroom is to attempt to relate my interpretation of these metaphors—for metaphors they are and powerful ones too, as they help us understand two of the dominant modes of living in Western intellectual history.

Nietzsche provides the critical distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian. He views Apollonian as the impulse in which one sees things as detached from real experiences. These are the theoretical, intellectual impulses, which are constantly striving after measure, order and harmony—the impulses to preserve conform and moralize.1

By contrast, Nietzsche sees the Dionysian mode of living as the style in which life is relived and reaffirmed, in which life's joys and sufferings are re-experienced.2

Ruth Benedict, in contrasting the life styles of different tribes of North American Indians also uses these two descriptive metaphors. She uses Apollinian and Dionysian as two entirely different ways of arriving at the values of existence.3 In her view, the Dionysian pursues these values by breaking away from the limits put upon him by his five senses, in order to enter another form of experience. "The desire of the Dionysian, in personal experience or in ritual, is to pass through it toward a certain psychological state, to achieve excess".4 Through this frenzied state he hopes to lose his individual state and find true wisdom.

According to Benedict, the Apollonian views this frenzied emotional state of the Dionysian with a great deal of skepticism. Since the Apollonian has no awareness of such experience, he doubts its value. He does not attempt to achieve "disruptive psychological states" but instead prefers to keep his individuality and here Benedict quotes Nietzsche as saying that the Apollonian "remains what he is and retains his civic name."  

It is not enough to say that the Apollonian impulse "rules the head" while the Dionysian impulse "rules the heart." Nor is it sufficient to say that the Apollonian-Dionysian contrast is the contrast of law and lawlessness or structure and freedom. Still more is involved. The major difference between the Apollonian and Dionysian impulse is the focus of their life-embarrassment.  

After an exploration of what I see as the life-embarrassment implied by these two terms, I hope to move on, finally, to what all of this has to do with teachers and kids and classrooms.  

The Apollonian, always striving for harmony and order, emphasizes self-awareness, the principle of the individual—the life contemplative. Apollonian man is a man of thought, of reflection. He exposes himself to the ideal of great men, great art, and history; he reflects on this and searches inside himself for truth and virtue. He studies life and attempts, through meditation, to impose some order on it. Apollonian man avoids, at any cost, giving up his own personality and faith in himself as final arbiter in all his experiences. In other words, he attempts to preserve self-consciousness.  

On the other hand, the Dionysian considers the principle of the individual as the source and primal cause of stultification and Nietzsche refers to Dionysian man as "one who has realized a temporary identification with the principle of life." Under the spell of Dionysus there are no boundaries between man and nature or between man and man.  

Schooling, as it has traditionally been conducted, places considerable emphasis on Apollonian values. Apollonian influence is apparent in that teaching is structured to lead the individual through a set of ordered experiences which, theoretically, will enable him to search inside himself for answers to eternal questions about life. This type of schooling encourages experiences of thought rather than experiences of feeling. It asks the student to handle abstract ideas and symbols rather than deal with his emotions and feelings on an experiential level. It poses questions which require the student to look inside himself for answers and, following this insight, to act accordingly. The student is admonished to "do your own work" and "don't talk to your neighbor" which clearly places emphasis on the student himself to work out his own problems without any outside help.  

The principle behind this kind of schooling is that the individual must learn early that he is the final source for all answers concerning his life and therefore, he must learn to depend on himself alone as early as possible.  

An example of Apollonian teaching is the case of the teacher who encourages her students to formulate questions, to evaluate principles, to explain, to define, to conclude. This teacher requires her students to reflect upon the subject at hand, to read books and write papers so that they may be better able to translate the subject matter into a form more understandable to them.  

In recent years, many educators have become alarmed at this "increasing separation between intellect and feeling" and have proposed various ways of rectifying the situation. Many of these proposals merely shift the emphasis from Apollonian forms of schooling to Dionysian forms of schooling. They reason that the sterile Apollonian emphasis on abstract forms of thought has created a society of alienated individuals who only value intellectual endeavor and whose attempts to discount "the feeling side" of the nature of man has caused them to become increasingly depersonalized and unable to relate to each other. Those who propose to remedy the present situation by a shift to Dionysian forms of schooling, plan to do so by shifting the emphasis from thought to feeling. Their thesis is that whatever a student learns through physical and emotional interaction with the world is the most worthwhile learning. Therefore, they have turned their classrooms into laboratories for physical experimentation. These Dionysian teachers believe that this type of learning will affect the student to the point that he will no longer need the introspection and questioning heretofore thought to be so important to his education.  

The Dionysian teacher would encourage his students to be unashamed of their feelings no matter how small they may seem to be. Such feelings are viewed as important to the Dionysian teacher because he believes that to deny such feelings is to dehumanize oneself to the full force of humanness. Such a teacher would hold that subject matter or objective knowledge is relatively unimportant when compared with the emotional and moral development possible with Dionysian teaching. The Dionysian teacher sees education as a sharing which enables participants to reach a level of understanding about reality that is not possible for the lone individual.  

Although teachers have been influenced by both Apollonian and Dionysian modes of viewing the world and the classroom, the problem is that they are often sold on one of these forms of schooling, almost to the exclusion of the other. As teacher educators we are really short-changing students through our refusal to more fully integrate the methods implied in Apollonian and Dionysian perspectives. Even though the two modes of teaching are almost always used in conjunction with each other, it is to a very limited extent.  

If education is viewed comprehensively as involving a combination of Dionysian and Apollonian experiences, a novel set of educational goals emerge. Some of the qualities possessed by an educated individual when viewed from both Apollonian and Dionysian perspectives are:  

1. One who is able to interact with other members of society with sufficient understanding of his needs and rights as well as recognition of the needs and rights of others.  
2. One who is able to organize information in a way that is meaningful to him and is able to internalize this information and apply it to his daily life.  
3. One who finds joy and meaning in his profession, field, vocation and has been able to commit himself to purposeful pursuit of knowledge in that area.  
4. One who is able to enjoy to the fullest extent his all-experiencing being; who can take pleasure in the lived moment of Dionysian experience, and can later integrate that experience so that it becomes a bright thread in the variegated tapestry that is his life.
Having delineated some of the qualities of an individual whose educational experiences have been meaningful from both Apollonian and Dionysian perspectives, it now seems pertinent to look at some of the things teachers can do (and are doing) to create such educational experiences.

Planning experiences, which will assist the student not only in learning to enjoy his experiencing, feeling self, but also in learning to reflect on experiences, internalize them, and derive some meaning from them, is no easy task. The following are some suggested teacher actions which should be of assistance in planning such experiences.

1. The teacher approaches his class as a lone individual with ideas and feelings he wants to share with them, rather than as a representative of established authority.

2. The teacher's attitude toward his students is one of openness and acceptance. He realizes that they have varied interests, feelings and attitudes and that his subject matter must have some relevance to their individual lives for them to be capable of grasping meaning from it (in the Apollonian phase) (values them as members of the group in the Dionysian phase).

3. The teacher plans classroom experiences to include every student in some way. He encourages each student to freely share his ideas and feelings with the class; emphasizing that no opinion is without value, because opinions are the result of one's own experiences. The teacher explains to his students that, since no two people have exactly the same background, each person's ideas are unique in that they are grounded in his own experiencing of life. Therefore, the teacher encourages his students to express themselves because otherwise they may be depriving other class members of new ideas (otherwise Dionysian experience cannot occur).

4. The teacher encourages experiences of reflection and gives outside assignments which require careful, well-thought-out work. The teacher assigns telling questions regarding his subject-matter field; questions which require the student to put this subject matter in the context of his life and his relation to society.

5. The teacher uses many different methods; he enthusiastically shares ideas in group discussion; he questions students to see if they are gaining a clear understanding of assigned topics; he assigns projects which require students to relate abstract principles to physical performance; he may give interesting, well-thought-out lectures in order to explicate different points of view which confuses students; he turns questions around and asks: "What do you think?" when he senses that students are exploiting his knowledge of content in order to avoid involving themselves in work; he requires outside paper work which does not merely report what great thinkers have said, but rather expresses the thoughts of the student and how those thoughts relate to other works in the field. The teacher is prepared to interchange these many methods in order to obtain and keep the interest of his students.

6. More important than any of the above suggestions is that the teacher be willing to use everything in his power when he enters the classroom. He should actively work to create a Dionysian experience; completely immerse himself in the experience of the moment; so that he feels and senses the proper thing to do for his students now. In order to free himself for such classroom experience, he must give a great deal of time outside the classroom to Apollonian reflection and evaluating (i.e. where has the class been, where is it going, what is the next step, etc.). During this reflection he must also ask himself what effect his class and his students are having on his life (i.e. is he growing, is he fulfilled). If the teacher is not insisting that he get as much from the class as his students, he is cheating both himself and his students.

Both Apollonian and Dionysian forms are necessary in the classroom because, taken alone, the Apollonian mode of being can be cold, isolated and lonely, and the Dionysian is soon over, leaving those who depend solely on its merits empty. Together, they complement each other, and form a gestalt of Dionysian-experiencing/Apollonian-evaluating which is vital not only to classroom experience of the group but also to the intellectual development of the individual.

Notes
2. Ibid., page 67.
4. Ibid., page 72.
5. Ibid., page 72.
6. Ibid., page 72.
Do you sometimes agree with both the humanists and the behaviorists?

A re-examination and resolution of the Behaviorism vs. Humanism debate for counselors

by Richard V. Peach

Richard V. Peach earned his M.Sc.Ed. degree at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. In 1976 he received his M.S. at Kansas State University where he is now completing his Ph.D. in counseling. His professional interests include social learning theory approaches to psychotherapy and developmental disabilities.

The individual exposed to “humanistic” and “behavioristic” literature throughout his university schooling, whether in psychology or education, may after each successive exposure to one particular school reflect, “I agree with that.” The inconsistency of finding ground for agreement in two supposedly different schools of thought concerning the nature of what is meaningful in the examination and understanding of man, eventually will, or should, create a tension that needs to be resolved.

The debate as rival techniques

At present when the terms “behaviorism” and “humanism” come up in discussion they are usually in the form of the adjectives: “behavioristic” and “humanistic.” In other words, the bulk of the literature we read is not so much concerned with the theory or philosophical base of these two schools of thought but rather the techniques which claim to be derived from them. Our concentration is on technique. For behaviorists the discussion might center around the merits of programmed instruction, using a machine versus the use of books and teachers, or the most appropriate techniques for classroom management.

In the humanist camp, particularly in the area of individual development, the discussion might center around the relative merits of the “sensitivities training” or the “encounter” approach, vs. the “T-Group” approach. These group counseling techniques are usually the method of intervention preferred by humanist counselors.

With this focus on technique the issue as to who has the most effective technology is raised. Educators and psychologists of the behavioral persuasion usually feel that they have an advantage here. Because they are content to focus on, and attempt to measure only behavior, they can offer fairly conclusive evidence for the effectiveness of their work. (e.g. The client’s fetishistic reaction either persisted or it didn’t.) Behaviorists like to point to the dearth of convincing studies pointing to the effectiveness of group growth experiences, the main tool of the humanists. Campbell and Dunnett (1968) and Smith (1975) have published in the Psychological Bulletin two of the most comprehensive and rigorous reviews. To grossly paraphrase: Campbell and Dunnett find some changes in behavior, but virtually no evidence which is satisfactory to them, regarding the effectiveness of T-group experiences on managerial personnel relative to their organizational roles; Smith reviewed studies on the outcome of sensitivity training and after calling out numerous studies which didn’t obtain measures from controls, which didn’t use a repeated measures design, and which didn’t satisfy a minimal time duration, was able to find a group of 100 powerful studies, only seventy-five of which detected significant predicted changes in behavior.

Behaviorists would argue that in view of this literature one has to work rather hard to find convincing evidence for the effectiveness of humanistically orientated techniques. Is this a problem to the humanist?

No! At this point the humanist returns to the definition of his field. Humanists right from the beginning had, almost in anticipation, set up a defense. This defense might be called “engage and devour” eclecticism. The basis of this strategy is contained in any definition of humanist psychology one might like to review. Here is that provided by Cohen in Hans Eysenck’s Encyclopedia of Psychology, 1972.

“IT” (humanistic psychology) “does not deny the validity of any psychological work with sound
credentials, in theory and method. It insists, however (and this is its distinctive feature), that a comprehensive psychology of man cannot be delimited by particular methods (experimental or statistical), any more than a cartographer can omit oceans or mountain ranges merely because he cannot traverse the former or scale the latter.

This definition by its brevity actually allows the inclusion of behaviorism: "... does not deny the validity of any psychological work which has sound credentials." Humanists seemingly are not denying the validity of focusing on overt behavior as a basis of analysis for predicting future behavior but they are implying that there is more to human behavior than this element alone.

The debate as philosophical differences

Where then do the differences lie, as there are in fact differences, and what led to this rather messy state of affairs? Interestingly, the fundamental distinction between behaviorism and humanism is philosophical and is revealed when one examines the problem of knowledge: (i.e. what is knowledge?).

"Empiricism" and "rationalism" are two major opposing positions in the argument concerning the relationship between experience and the organization of the mind. Hilgard and Bower (1975) makes the distinction very nicely. To paraphrase: The British Empiricists in line with the positivism of Comte developed a doctrine that knowledge was derived through sensory experience. Complex ideas were constructed of simpler ideas and these in turn could further be reduced. They believed that the mind was like a machine built out of simple components each in an additive relationship to the next. They also believed that ideas were connected through the action of association or contiguity in experience.

In contrast the European rationalists, Descartes, Leibnitz and Kant argued that reason alone rather than sense data, spiritual revelation or any other source was the basis of knowledge. They also argued that certain types of knowledge were a priori.

Empiricism was very powerful in the history of the rebellion of psychology against philosophy. In this rebellion of empiricism research attempted to render obsolete any speculations about the nature of the universe. This tradition starts with Ebbinghaus and Thordyke, in the 1830's and 90's and has continued in the 20th Century with Pavlov, Watson and Skinner. Meditations and introspection on the nature of the soul, the psyche, the mind and so on were replaced by observations and experiments concerning the behavior of living organisms, including human beings. Without this work, psychology, under the influence of such as Titchener, could have remained the asylum for philosophical meditation forever.

It is clear that the empiricist tradition gave impetus to this development. Empiricism's notions, particularly that of associationism, are fundamental to the concepts of the "law of effect", Guthrie's contiguity theory of learning and classical and operant conditioning. However, rationalism has received considerable support for the notions of a priori knowledge from psychologists working on perceptual development and depth perception (Hilgard and Bower, 1975, p. 3). Associationism is also an inadequate principle to use when explaining the "well-formedness" of most speech in-puts and out-puts. Associationism allows for no mechanism by which the individual can sort out a "word salad" from a meaningful sentence.

The debate as it is now presented is essentially between behaviorally oriented and cognitively and perceptually oriented psychologists who both utilize the empirical approach to knowledge embodied in the present day hypothetico-deductive model of scientific investigation. Given their differences in philosophical origin, it is understandable that professional quarrels occur as to the adequacy of their respective explanations for behavior. Humanist psychologists, however, aren't usually associated with cognitive or perceptual research, so having rejected the common implied inclusion of behaviorism by humanism and pointed to the philosophical gap between behaviorism and one of the derivatives of rationalism, cognitive psychology, where does this leave us in our examination of the differences between behaviorism and humanism?

Humanist psychology and ideology

A closer look at the literature of humanistic psychology seems to indicate that the substantive difference is actually political.

Charles Hampden-Turner's book Radical Man (1970) is probably the best researched and documented presentation of the contemporary humanistic position. In Radical Man Hampden-Turner develops three themes: a critique of current social scientific philosophy and the research it generates, his own model of man, and the application of that model in the analysis of contemporary social settings. The empiricism and positivism which is so extravagantly displayed by behaviorists such as Skinner, and the structural-functionalism found in the sociology of Talcott Parsons and Radcliff-Brown is seen by Hampden-Turner as essentially conservative in function. Man is examined as he is and the causes for his condition directed. By studying man in this fashion a sanctification of the status quo takes place, which is only a short step from saying "this is the way it will be" or "this is the way it has to be". Thus for Hampden-Turner the image of man implicit in the practice of science is that of an atomized, depersonalized, determined man.

Hampden-Turner's work was a product of the sixties. The sixties were a well-spring for humanism and typically Hampden-Turner provides us with an alternative image of man: A man with a "synthesizing capacity which turns brain input into novel output, a man with a symbolizing and exploring capacity, and a man who engages in a model of psycho-social development such that through investment of his own "authenticity" and through risk taking he achieves higher synergy."

Unfortunately for Hampden-Turner he uses as evidence for his model of man the effectiveness of T-Group training, an effectiveness we have already seen is somewhat doubtful. This leads to a little veracity to the model. Also, while the practice of social science investigation does often produce a rather dismal picture as humanism like Hampden-Turner points out, this is by no means a result of the epistemology on which it is based. Indeed, this argument is a basic weakness of the humanist position. A behaviorally oriented social scientist can have a utopian goal for man, even if Watzlawick is not everyone's idea of utopia.

The organism and behaviorism

We have observed that cognitive and perceptual psychology are the natural heirs to rationalism while humanist psychology is a step child as it is more of a political doctrine rather than a psychological discipline. It now
seems only fair to see if behaviorism also has feet of clay. It does. The problem is not philosophical, rather it concerns assumptions about the subject being studied.

Herrnstein (1977) argues that Skinnerian behaviorism, in its efforts to demonstrate the control of its technology over behavior, made a number of assumptions which down-played the role of the organism. An implicit assumption was that of equipotentiality, that any response and reinforcer and any conditioned stimulus and unconditioned stimulus can be associated equally well. Seligman (1970) suggests degree of "preparedness" as an alternative concept because some responses are simply more "natural" to the animal than others. For example, pigeons more readily peck for food reinforcers than peck for shock avoidance.

Skinner makes a great deal out of the notion that the taught responses of this animal are "arbitrary." They are not necessarily natural to the animal and the reinforcer is not linked directly to the response. That is, the animal might lever-press for totally different reinforcement consequences—food, drink, escape, etc. However, Skinnerian psychologists have to specify both the range of dimensions of the stimulus and the response. As it turns out, they do this in terms of "natural lines of fracture." These natural lines of fracture depend on the physical measures of the stimulus and response, the contingencies of reinforcement (how much change in stimulus will produce the response and at what point changes in the response mode will constitute a change in the response), and the characteristics of the organism itself. Commercial animal trainers Brelend and Breland (1961) were among the first to point out the contamination of response classes by their reinforcers. Raccoons, indulged in washing behavior with coins they had to collect for reinforcement and pigs rooted with the coins under a similar contingency. These organisms clearly have predispositions to certain behavioral routines. This challenges the notion of equipotentiality and in terms of this evidence the consideration of natural lines of fracture in a response is in itself a contradiction of the notion of arbitrariness.

Closely tied to the above argument is the Skinnerian notion of drive. For him drive might be defined as a particular class of classes of behavior. The covariation in these classes and their reinforcers makes the concept necessary even for Skinner. These drives are commonly referred to as hunger, thirst, sex, etc. and behaviorists usually assume that they are Few in number. As a consequence, they are argued to have salience in a very wide range of situations. The corrective concern with these few primary drives has diverted attention from the reinforcing nature of a behavior performed without an external reinforcer. It is interesting to note that sexual gratification is in essence not the presence of the partner but the experience of internal gratification, a consequence of sexual behaviors. The reinforcer is behavior, not an object.

If a response is self-reinforcing then it can't also be arbitrary. Herrnstein (1977) urges that academic psychologists studying animal behavior must look more to ethology if they wish to have a greater understanding of behavior's intrinsic power to reinforce.

Every school pupil has been told that speech and language are what make our species unique. It is interesting that it is in this specific behavior that Skinner's operant model experiences its greatest problems of prediction and has had its plausibility come into most doubt when compared with more traditional and organism oriented views (Chomsky, 1959, Lennieburg, 1969).

Enter the counselor

This state of affairs leaves the counselor in a particularly exciting position. If he desires he can freely adopt the ideology of humanism and the techniques and methods of analysis derived from both cognitive personality and behavioralism. Indeed Lazarus (1977) argues that even among "behavior therapists" "only a few clewarts would not agree that the stimulus-response 'learning theory' basis of behavior therapy is passe and that a distinctly cognitive orientation now prevails."

The real world of human suffering has forced clinicians together at a time when theorists are prepared to acknowledge the deficiencies in their respective analyses.

Mahoney (1977) observes that in the 1960's the "insight-oriented" therapists were frustrated because they couldn't induce change and the behavior therapists were frustrated because of the restrictiveness of their theory and technology.

The new hybrid is the cognitive or social-learning trend now developing in psychotherapy. Its origins are in the thought management programs of Carnegie (1946) and Peal (1963). Later Rotter (1954), Kelly (1955) and Bandura (1961, 1973) produced academic publications. Interestingly, Ellis's (1962, 1975) rational-emotive therapy gained popular support before it achieved any professional respectability.

In therapy there are three primary objectives: 1) perceptual skills, 2) performance skills and 3) associative skills. The client is taught to examine his environment and to analyze his thoughts and emotions about it. He is also taught to evaluate his associations, that is his expectations and perceived contingencies, and he is taught the relationship between his cognitions and his performance and emotions. Goals are set and behaviors and outcomes noted and monitored by the therapist.

The counselor is presently freed from having to label himself, and what has been at times something of a tiresome debate has been largely resolved, leaving him free to pursue the broadest and most effective approach with his client.

Summary

To the extent that humanist and cognitive psychologists share the same philosophical base they can be reconciled with behaviorism in social learning theory.
Bibliography


Growth of Knowledge

The growth of knowledge might be likened to an expanding balloon, with the volume of air inside the balloon representing the known and the skin of the balloon marking the boundary between the known and the unknown. As the volume of the known increases, so does the surface area of the balloon—the extent of the boundary between the known and unknown—so that the more we see, the more we see there is to see.

The framework of this paper is intended to make the decision points of curriculum work more obvious.

Decision points in curriculum work

by Gerald M. Mager

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The field of curriculum has captured the attention of many educators, both those who are chiefly practitioners and those who are chiefly theorists. The field has harnessed their energies, intellects, and imaginations in the hope of producing some incremental advance in the larger context called education.

Theories have been espoused, practices have gained favor, principles have been enumerated, and models have been implemented: all under the guise of curriculum development, reform, theorizing, and practice. What has resulted, through a century or more of earnest efforts, is a field rich in ideas and weak in practices, but unquestionably poor in organization. One of this lack of order has come seemingly conflicting practices and virulent disagreement among theorists. Consequently, the field of curriculum has been unable to contribute steadily to the conduct of education.

In the final paper of the 1947 Conference on Curriculum Theory Virgil Herriot and Ralph Tyler (1950, p. 123) called for a clearer understanding of the how's and what's of curriculum theorizing:

... the problem would be clarified and the issues would be kept clear if the writers on the various topics of curriculum development would make sure that the reader is always told what decisions are being made and exactly how these decisions are being reached. It would be especially helpful if the points where value judgments operate were honestly recognized and critically discussed in the writings on curriculum theory. The second suggestion is that some critical study be made of the role of values in curriculum investigation and that the implications of this study be shown for the development of curriculum theory and practice.

Nearly three decades later, such understandings as these are still not forthcoming in the theory, and practitioners yet gloss over important value judgments. The purpose of this essay, then, is to suggest one framework for organizing and viewing the field of curriculum in the broader context of education. The framework is intended to make more obvious the decision points of curriculum work and at the same time to put into perspective the theories and practices now abundant in the field. It is in effect a meta-theory; that is, a theory of theories. If it is useful for educators interested in curriculum work, it will have served a purpose. If it brings to the field a sense of unity, or inspires another more helpful perspective, it will have served equally as well.

Education as a social action

Philip Kotler, in a 1972 essay, identifies what he has termed "The Elements of Social Action." These five elements, cause, agency, target, channel, and strategy, are ways of viewing and organizing the parts that seem to be common to all social action. Kotler (Zaltman, Kotler and Kaufman, 1972, p. 174) defines social action as "the undertaking of collective action to mitigate or resolve a social problem." Though the use of the term "social problem" seems to narrow the scope of what Kotler identifies as social action, clearly education falls within the broader understanding of what he intends. Kotler explains more fully:

... large scale social action, as a species of social behavior is a relatively recent phenomena. Today, large numbers of people join or support causes
aimed at improving some aspect of society. They raise money for medical causes, give time to the needy, protest social injustice, and even challenge the established social order. Socially concerned people are organized, aided and abetted by a growing number of professional social actionists—lawyers, ministers, social workers, community organizers, social-planners, teachers, radicals. (1972, p. 174)

Making the assumption that education is indeed a form of social action and interpreting it through Kotler’s five elements establishes a framework through which the field of curriculum may be viewed in its greater context. Thus a perspective is brought to education, curriculum theory, and practices that highlights the critical decision points facing educators.

In this essay, each of the five elements will be studied separately, as it applies to the social action called education. Though there may appear to emerge a chronology or sequence in which the elements “naturally” occur, closer examination will reveal that such an ordering is not real in education or curriculum. Further, it must be recognized that each of these elements has a vertical dimension ranging from the concrete to the abstract. This introduces yet another complication into the problem at hand for an idea presented simultaneously on more than one level may appear to be two or more ideas, thus leading to confusion and even argument.

**Education’s causes**

Kotler (1972, p. 174) defines cause as “a social objective or undertaking that change agents believe will provide some answer to a social problem.” He distinguishes three types of causes including helping causes, protest (or reform) causes, and revolutionary causes. For which of these three types of causes or goals education is undertaken is not immediately clear.

Much of the theory and many of the practices endemic to education would seem to espouse helping causes: some educators seek to abrogate poverty by providing the poor with skills which will enable them to find employment; a particular teacher sets as her goal that a particular student learn how to more productively work in groups. In both cases the goals are of a helping nature. But examples of reform and revolutionary goals may also be identified. An English teacher has his students read and discuss *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* to interest them in the plight of peoples subject to institutional care. At one time, school systems across the nation taught about the “evils of communism” to build in the students strong defenses against any conspiratorial influences, and fostered student governments to give students practice in functioning as citizens in a democracy. These actions endorse an anti-revolutionary goal.

Each of these kinds of causes represents a different perspective on the nature and purpose of education in American society. Equally important, in the words of

**Figure 1**

*DIMENSIONS OF CAUSES IN EDUCATION AS A SOCIAL ACTION*

*Value-based decision alternatives*
Herrick and Tyler, these represent decision points based on value judgments—decisions which ought to be recognized as such. Glossing over such decisions, or failing to realize that value-based decisions are being made confounds curriculum work. Theorists oppose each other on priorities of education, unable to see that their differences are grounded in essentially different causes for education; practitioners argue methods with the same myopia.

There are yet other dimensions on which various causes or goals of education may differ. Figure 1 represents some of these dimensions graphically. Causes for education which are found in both theory and practice, therefore, fall on a continuum from broad to specific. Herrick and Tyler (1950, pp. 121-2) identify three foci for these goals: society, the individual, and knowledge. Goals in any of these three areas may, again, range from broad to specific.

William T. Harris, educational reformer in the last century, called education a process “by which the individual is elevated into a species.” (Pinar, 1975, p. 20) In doing so, he declares a value position which lies along the continuum of goals somewhat closer to the societal focus than that of the individual.

Saylor and Alexander (1974, p. 18) state that the central goal of schooling “and therefore of the curriculum and its planning, is the most complete development educationally feasible and socially acceptable of the self-directing, continuing learner.” Their emphasis, therefore, lies chiefly with the individual.

Other theorists have emphasized the role of the disciplines; common practice in many schools has done the same. Further, those who favor the core curriculum look at knowledge somewhat differently. Gordon Vars (1969, p. 5) writing of core curriculum, lists two long-range goals of education in the United States: “to prepare citizens who can function effectively in a democratic society, and...to help each person become a fully functioning individual.” Vars’ broadly stated, bi-polar goals underscore the emphasis on functional knowledge. Even so-called goal-free or open-ended curricula implicitly pursue identifiable goals.

What is important here is that each dimension of causes in education represents points at which value-based decisions are made. To choose one cause is to not choose another. To act as if one cause, or set of causes, is preeminent, is to de-emphasize another. Curricular decisions, of course, must be made. But these decisions should be made with full knowledge of the greater context of alternatives. The inevitable differences between and among theorists or practitioners should be seen as grounded in value-based decisions. The goal-setting aspect of curriculum work can then be held in perspective.

Agents In Education and Schooling

The social action element called agency is defined as “an organization whose primary mission is to advance a social cause.” (Kotter, 1972, p. 174) Many agencies in American society can and do act as educational agents. Vars, having identified the two long-range goals of education, states that within society, several institutions share responsibility for pursuing the goals. Some of these agencies include the schools, industry and business, churches, government, and the family. There are also agents such as students, teachers, administrators, parents, community groups, and specialists involved. Increasingly shared responsibility among all of these agencies and agents is being recognized.

Lawrence Cremin (1976, p. 58) forcefully supports this point in arguing for an “ecological approach” to education: “The fact is that the public is educated by many institutions, some of them private and some of them public, and that public schools are only one among several important public institutions that educate the public.” Thus, a value question is once again put before educators and more particularly curriculum workers: To what extent and for what causes should they direct their efforts? Theorists and practitioners face this issue when confronted with proposals on such issues as sex education, moral education, and even career education. In all cases, the decision as to who or which institution is to act as an educational agent, given a cause, is once again a value-based matter that should be recognized as such.

Once a decision has been made that the schools and school personnel will promote a cause, yet another decision must be made. Kotter divides change agents into leaders and supporters. In curriculum work, who shall act as leader and who shall support the effort? Regarding the possible choices for these roles, there is some disagreement in both theory and practice.

In 1961, William Alexander reported that elementary and secondary principals ranked the textbook as the resource most influencing the instructional program (Passow, 1962, p. 15). More recent surveys repeat this finding. Clearly textbook writers and publishers continue to function as “leaders” in curriculum development, but there are other approaches. Some of these cast local educators in the role of leader, as do Fymler and Hawn (1970, p. 3). Saylor and Alexander (1974, p. 42+), however, place the student in the leadership position, and the teacher, resource specialist, and community educator in supportive roles. Finally, in many areas, the parents are increasingly taking the initiative in curriculum change by defining, extending, and sometimes restricting the goals, materials and processes at work in the schools.

Thus, several dimensions of decision-making exist in any consideration of curriculum work. In curriculum development, theorizing and practice, these dimensions represent points at which decisions are made, thoughtfully or unthinkingly. They are the points at which disagreements can occur and differences can be resolved. And they represent points at which, for whatever reasons, value choices are made.

Channels: The Educational Event

In discussing channels as an element in education as social action, Kotter (1972, p. 174) defines these as “ways in which influence and response can be transmitted between change agents and change targets.” As applied to education, channels are then the points at which the social action occurs: the educational event. One part of that event is the curriculum. Figure 2 places curriculum into an interactive relationship with three other parts of the educational event. School organization, the learning process, and the instructional process have all received wide attention in the literature. Each contains a complex of decisions for the change agent to consider.

In the consideration of curriculum as part of the educational event, and a part of the channels by which the agent works toward a cause, there are two central value
questions which must be faced: How should the curriculum be developed, and what should the curriculum contain? Value-based answers to both these questions are found throughout the literature. Both theory and practice are replete with the efforts of curriculum workers to resolve these complex issues.

In an attempt to clarify the first, James Macdonald has suggested that there have been three distinguishable approaches to curriculum theory developed. Pinar (1975, pp. 5-6). The first approach is followed by those predominantly concerned with developing curriculum theory explicitly to guide practice, and thus curriculum workers following this approach might be called "utilitarians." The second approach is based on the idea that activity involving curriculum can be studied in terms of variables and the relationships among them. This "scientific" approach to curriculum theorizing has been less widely used. Individuals thinking and working in this tradition might be called "scientists." The third approach identified by Macdonald is characterized by Pinar as a basic reconceptualization of the field of curriculum theory. Macdonald described these efforts in this way:

"...look upon the task of theorizing as a creative intellectual task which... should be neither used as a basis for prescription or as an empirically testable set of principles and relationships. The purpose... in developing a critical concept schema, is... to hope that new ways of talking about curriculum, which may in the future be far more fruitful than present orientations, will be forthcoming. (Pinar, 1975, p. 6)"

These three theory realms seem to encompass the vast majority of curriculum theory efforts. In addition to providing answers to the question of how curriculum should be developed, they provide helpful guides in making order out of a wide range of practical curriculum development operations as well.

The other persistant value question, What should the curriculum contain? is not so easily addressed. The value preferences undergirding curriculum decisions are very complex and often difficult to discern. Just a sampling of the alternatives evidences this point.

John Dewey (1938, 1973, p. 89) theorized that education (and hence, the curriculum) should be based on experience—the actual life experience of the individual student. In contrast, much of the science curriculum work of the 1980's took as its starting point the nature of the discipline: its structure and processes. A very different curriculum resulted. Arthur Lewis and Alice Miel present a classification of conceptions of the curriculum which has two major categories: curriculum as something intended, and curriculum as something actualized. Examples within each range from the course of study in the first category to the learner's actual experience in the second (Saylor and Alexander, 1974, p. 3). Curriculum designs that would fall into one of these categories would, once again, reflect the values of the curriculum worker.

From a very different perspective, George Beauchamp calls for the curriculum to be a written document, thus rejecting the notion that the curriculum should be considered to contain the educational experiences of a youth at school (Saylor and Alexander, 1974, p. 4). B.O. Smith questioned whether the curriculum should reflect the wisdom of the past, or make a leap into the unknown future world (Herrick and Tyler, 1950, pp. 7-11).

Obviously then, what the curriculum should be like is a question with a multitude of answers. What is important in this context, however, is the awareness of the breadth and complexity of the decisions made in curriculum work. This is significant because, just as with the elements of cause and agent, the element of channels represent a focus of value-based decisions.

**Targets of Education**

Kotter (1972, p. 174) defines the target as "individuals, groups, or institutions designated as the targets of change efforts." There are essentially four levels of both intermediate and ultimate targets: individuals, groups or classes, institutions, and society as a whole.

The literature provides many examples of each type of target group. Target can be closely related to cause, for many goals of education are explicit in naming those toward whom they are directed. One example might be a vocational training curriculum which has as its target individuals who do not possess the skills necessary to get the job they desire. Other groups or classes in society have likewise been the targets of curricula: the "disadvantaged" child, the "exceptional" child, the emerging adolescent, the college bound, the retired person, the person retraining for a new job. Curricula have also targeted institutions in society. Governmental bodies, industries, businesses, and religious bodies have been the targets of educational social action. Choosing among these various targets is definitely a value-based decision. Kotter also describes targets as being either intermediate or ultimate. Reflection on the distinction raises yet another set of value questions. For example, is the individual, or is the society as a whole the ultimate target of educational causes? This question, as the others raised in this essay, is not easily answered.

Clearly, a question of ethics is raised in "targeting" any individual or group for a cause. This is not to say that education and curriculum work should cease. It is to say, however, that the planned workings of one group of people on another should raise serious concern about the nature of those workings and their eventual results. This concern leads directly to a discussion of strategy, the final element of social action.

**Strategy: A Critical Decision**

The discussion of the element strategy was intentionally held until last as its importance comes from the context of the elements discussed earlier. Kotter (1972, p. 174) defines strategy as "the basic mode of influence adopted by the change agent to affect the change target." He continues with a definition and description of three major types of strategies (Kotter, 1972, pp. 103-4):

A power strategy is one that attempts to produce behavioral compliance or cooperation in the change target through the use of agent-controlled sanctions.

A persuasion strategy is one that attempts to induce the desired behavior in the change target through identifying the social object with the change agent's existing beliefs or values.

A reeducative strategy is one that attempts to induce the desired behavior in the change target through the internalization of new beliefs or values.
Given these various types of strategy, there are several types of questions which must be considered by educators: Descriptive, what strategy is most often employed? Valuative, what strategy is preferable? And ethical, what strategy is conscionable?

Obviously the questions of strategy cut across all other elements of education as social action, and it is exactly on this key element that recent critics of American education have had a considerable impact. Holt, Kozol, and Illitch view the compulsory attendance of American schools, coupled with the problems of educational bureaucracies and the sometimes stifling effects of classroom life, as the chief arguments against the system as it now exists. In light of the compulsory attendance laws alone, a re-examination of causes, agents, channels, and targets is inescapable. Do educators-agents-have the right to work their goals through a curriculum-channel on a student-target group when that group is subject to the compulsory attendance-power strategy? And if educators do indeed have that right, then what principles must govern their social action?

Of course, education may not use the strategy of power as extensively as such an example would imply, but the divisions are rarely clear. Some school activities are clearly based on persuasion, others on the educative strategy. Curricular patterns draw on all three strategies, and it may not be possible to cipher completely which activities depend on which strategies. Yet, it is important to remember that agents, whether they be school personnel or others, make many value-based decisions in the process of the social action called education. Many of those decision-points have been described in the discussions of each of the elements. Now those points take an added significance in consideration of strategy—the basic mode of influence—adopted in education.

Elements of Education as Social Action
An Application and Summary

Each of the five elements of social action has been defined and discussed as they might apply to the social action, education. Though it was necessary to discuss them at a time, in the realities of education any one or several may form the starting point for curriculum work. Lawrence Cremin's description of the curriculum work of Jerrold Zacharias, at all, on the Physical Sciences Study Committee (PSSC) is a case in point (Pinar, 1975, pp. 26-8).

As described by Cremin, Zacharias progressed through a 9-point process:

1. power strategy: a course is to be taught;
2. channel: the course is in the discipline of physics;
3. agent: scholars and expert teachers as leaders;
4. agent: supportive staffs and technical assistance;
5. channel: content, through development of syllabi and materials containing concepts and methods of physics;
6. persuasive strategy: materials made as engaging and efficient as possible;
7. target: students (non-specified);
8. channel: testing of materials in instructional situations;
9. agent: classroom teachers trained to use the materials.

Clearly there were some alternatives at various points in this curriculum development process which were either not chosen or not considered. Yet, this example can still illustrate how order can be made out of the process using Kotler's analysis of social action. Other curriculum work—theory and practice—could be similarly analyzed and studied. The literature gives examples of many patterns followed in practice or supported in theory, one not necessarily better than the next. Each pattern, however, represents a series of decision-points. Herrick and Tyler called for a clear statement of what decisions are being made and how they are made, and a better understanding of the role of values and ethics in curriculum work. A pattern which does not face the issue—address the value-based and ethical questions—in each of the elements has left a gap in its conception and development.

David Jenkins and Marten Shipman (1976, p. 6) define curriculum as

... the formulation and implementation of an educational proposal, to be taught and learned within a school or other institution and for which that institution accepts responsibility at three levels, its rationale, its actual implementation, and its effects.

Curriculum workers own a large share of that responsibility; both theorists and practitioners must insure that their work is complete and thoughtfully done.

In applying Kotler's elements to the processes of education, those responsible for the conduct of schooling will better understand the origin of differences and the grounds upon which agreement can flourish. The critical decisions of curriculum work are made public; discussions of alternatives is invited. The field of curriculum itself may become a more consistent contributor to the conduct of education.

References
One of the strongest points scored in this work is the attack on the concept that consolidation results in greater efficiency by making it possible to spend less in a district to attain the same level of performance. However, the result of consolidation is often to spend less to attain less. The authors cite the example of increased efficiency in the use of administrators. A small school of three hundred students with one superintendent is hardly less efficient than a large consolidated district with one superintendent serving fifty or more towns. The theory of economy of scale was originally intended to apply to products. "Applying this argument to people undermines the assumption of consistent quality, and invalidates the use of this concept in arguing for administrative efficiency."

Most people who have attended a small rural high school would agree with the findings of a study of Kansas schools conducted by Barker and Gump as cited in this monograph:

"The actual proportion of students who can participate in the essential activities which support the academic program, the quality of that involvement, and the satisfaction with that involvement, clearly favor the smaller community over the larger consolidated school."

In other words, a student in a small school has a greater opportunity for leadership involvements and extracurricular participation in such activities as music, dramas, journalism, and student government. Even though small schools offer fewer academic specialties, more students can participate in non-academic subjects such as music, ship, arts, and physical education.

If the evidence against the "bigger is better" concept is so strong, why then has the concept been so widely and unquestioningly accepted? The author cites several social factors responsible for this phenomena such as modernization of government, the increased prestige attributed to the profession of school administration, and financial incentives offered to those districts accepting consolidation. Added to these factors is the fact that "the arguments for consolidation have tremendous face validity." It is difficult to argue with "obvious" economies of scale, and the advantages of newer, more modern schools. Finally, educational outcomes are notoriously difficult to measure. For that reason, research into consolidation was conducted "in order to convince others to believe in consolidation, rather than to find some objective truth."

What are the alternatives to consolidation? The authors list several such as paying more attention to small schools. The possibility of bringing students to the resources rather than vice versa is an attractive alternative. Above all, any research demonstrating the value of proposed reforms should be more closely examined. The authors are openly honest in admitting that their stand has not yet been fully researched. If further research is needed in this area, educators should be demanding it.

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A new approach to budgeting and financial management


Developing a rational basis for budgeting has long been a problem for educational organizations as well as other government operations. For a time PPBS seemed to be the best solution. However, this attempt at financial accountability seemed to cause more difficulties than it solved. Financial managers in education would do well to consider zero-base budgeting as a process to solve many of the tough problems faced in developing budgets where a scarcity of resources prevails.

Peter Phyrr appears eminently qualified to write the book Zero-Base Budgeting: A Practical Management Tool for Evaluating Expenses. He guided the process in its initial stages for both Texas Instruments, Inc. and the state of Georgia. He has written in a straightforward manner resisting the temptation to be evangelical about this new approach. The book includes step by step descriptions of each phase of the process and includes many examples from both government and industry.

In traditional practice budgets are developed with primary reference to the previous year's expenditures. The only amounts that receive real scrutiny are increases over the past year. The basic concept of zero-base budgeting is that all budgeted amounts are open to careful review. Every program of the organization must be defended just as if it were being considered for the first time.

The first chapter gives a general overview of the zero-base budgeting process. The development and ranking of decision packages are the two basic steps. A decision package describes a specific activity or grouping of work along with the costs and alternative courses of action. Different levels of effort for each activity must be identified. The minimum level is the least amount of effort needed to keep the organization in operation. Additional levels are identified in separate decision packages along with the total costs involved.

Once decision packages for all the activities of an organization are developed they must be ranked in order of priority. This process requires input from administrators at all levels in the organization. It ensures that vital activities will be funded while those of lower priority will be included only if resources are available.

Chapter two briefly outlines the problems and benefits of implementing zero-base budgeting. The primary problem is the inherent resistance to any new procedure in an organization. The technical aspects of developing decision packages sometimes requires expertise that may be lacking. Ranking process problems also must be dealt with. The author gives specific suggestions for minimizing the problems that inevitably occur. The major benefits of zero-base budgeting include improved planning, follow on benefits, and improved development of the management team.

Chapters three and four describe the development of decision packages in much greater detail. The example of the Georgia Air Quality Laboratory provides an illustration of the budgeting process. The laboratory tests air samples collected throughout the state of Georgia. Three decision packages for different levels of effort were developed. Package A (the minimum) provided for testing of air samples covering 70 percent of the population; package B provided for 80 percent of the population, and package C for 90 percent. Costs were identified for each package. The decision-making process is described in detail along with the format and content of the decision packages.

The very difficult problem of ranking the decision packages is dealt with in chapter five. Unless care is taken this can grow into an impossible task. The initial ranking takes place at the level where the packages are developed. Higher levels of management concentrate on the lower priority packages as the top priority packages would automatically be funded. The author provides a detailed description of various approaches to the ranking process with sufficient illustrations to enable the reader to grasp this complex procedure.

While the first half of the book discusses the specific details of zero-base budgeting, the second half (chapters 6-10) deals with the budgeting process as a part of the management of the organization. A number of policy issues are discussed. In general the author does an excellent job of outlining a specific management problem, listing alternatives, and providing observations to be considered in arriving at a viable solution. In some instances a specific policy is suggested as "the best way to do it." In other cases several alternatives are explored with no specific recommendation. Throughout, organizational and management pitfalls are highlighted.

Since program budgeting was once considered as a solution to budgeting problems in education, it is only natural that PPBS and zero-base budgeting be compared. While program budgeting does have distinct advantages over the traditional approach, there are definitely gaps in the system. Phyrr suggests that zero-base budgeting can fill these gaps. He proposes a merger of the two systems to provide a truly effective management tool.

In complex organizations such as urban school districts, zero-base budgeting will inherently develop problems of volume. The total amount of paper work could become an overwhelming burden. Properly utilized, the computer can help solve many of these volume-oriented problems. In addition to data storage, the computer can aid in the analysis of decision packages and the ranking process.

Even though the book is filled with numerous
illustrations and examples, two appendices are presented with further aids for practical application. The first is a sample zero-base budgeting manual which is provided for managers who will be developing decision packages. The second is a list of decision package topics taken from both government and industry.

Peter Pyhrr has given a detailed account of a complex process. His book is written for managers in both government and industry who are involved in financial decision-making. There is a minimum of theory and a heavy emphasis on practical application. The author has been honest in pointing out the problems to be encountered, and resisted the temptation to overstate the possible benefits. The major disappointment is the lack of information regarding budgeting in the public schools. Maybe this will be the topic of a future book.

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Review

Legal rights of the gifted

Ernest E. Singletary, Gary D. Collings, and H. Floyd Dennis
Law Briefs on Litigation and the Rights of Exceptional Children, Youth, and Adults

There is little doubt that the recent expressions of concern focused upon appropriate education for exceptional children have brought about significant changes. Although legislation and litigation involving the identification and education of exceptional children are not recent phenomena, events of recent vintage, particularly the 1970's, record an exponential increase in progress toward the goal of fulfilling the needs of exceptional children. Foremost among such developments is the enactment of Public Law 94-142. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Like many other major pieces of legislation, most of the provisions of P.L. 94-142 have their genesis in case law. In light of efforts to provide appropriate education for exceptional children, including the provisions of P.L. 94-142, Law Briefs on Litigation and the Rights of Exceptional, Youth, and Adults should prove to be an especially timely and useful exposition of legal precedents.

The work is organized in seven major divisions: 1) right to an education; 2) testing, placement, and labeling; 3) commitment and treatment procedures: civil; 4) commitment and treatment procedures: criminal and quasi-criminal; 5) administration; 6) nonpublic and state schools; and, 7) finance. Each division is ordered into dimensions with each dimension “reflect(ing) not only the chronological development of the chapter topic, but . . . depict(ing) the progressive development of the chapter content. (pp. ii-iii)” For example, the division relating to testing, placement, and labeling is ordered into four dimensions.

The authors brief cases in the first dimension wherein rulings do not recognize consumers in the labeling process. Second dimension cases deal with abolition of “tracking” or ability grouping. The cases in the third dimension question the use of standardized tests, generally I.Q. tests, for placement in special classes. Finally, the fourth dimension case specifically outlines the necessary steps for insuring that mentally retarded children are afforded an appropriate education. The fourth dimension case culminates a logical sequence beginning with the absence of consumer influence upon labeling, and progressing through the use of ability grouping and standardized tests to the delineation of specific steps required for placement.

Although the use of the dimensional format generally provides a logical and progressive structure of development in each of the seven dimensions, there are instances where the authors have apparently strained to develop dimensions simply to maintain some degree of symmetry of commonality among the divisions. The division entitled “Nonpublic and State Schools” illustrates this point. The first dimension consists of “background information from a descriptive nonpublic school case,” and an examination of provisions of a New York statute relating to the use of “nonpublic schools as an alternative education. (p. 404)” The question in the “descriptive case” focuses upon the use of public aid for the education of exceptional children at a private institution. The cases in the second dimension involve basically the same question. Payment of “tuition” rather than “aid” in some of the second dimension cases marks the greatest distinction between the two dimensions in regard to the substance of the question. Cases in the third dimension settle questions relating to residency requirements, aid to sectarian schools, and tax deductions.

Despite the obvious difficulties of attempting to force the content into predetermined molds, Singletary, Collings, and Dennis have compiled a veritable storehouse of valuable and accessible information. The divisions on commitment and treatment exemplify both the scope and detail afforded topics throughout the book. The authors present detailed briefs of nearly a hundred cases covering both civil and criminal aspects of commitment and treatment procedures. The cases address a considerable breadth of questions ranging from “right to treatment” to “least restrictive environment.” Specific sections of selected cases are quoted in order to provide clarity in several issues.

In addition to the numerous court cases presented, sections describing court structure, court jurisdiction, legal precedent, and state and federal legislation are included. A handy reference to case law containing specific questions and a table of landmark cases located immediately following the table of contents add to the overall value of the book as an excellent source for those concerned with the education of exceptional children. The novice as well as the experienced educator will find this book a particularly useful reference for assistance in the determination of appropriate and legal educational applications.

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